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ABSTRACT 
The objective of Japanese space policy, since its beginning, was to “catch-up” with advanced space-
faring countries.  However, this “catching up” strategy is now facing with a lot of difficulties, due 
to the downturn of economy and progress of Japanese technology.  In these circumstances, Japa-
nese space community realized the necessity for changing its national space strategy.  In 2005, 
some Japanese powerful politicians issued a report on constructing national space strategy which 
demanded the government to establish new decision-making structure.  These efforts are focusing 
the need for Japanese space to shift the focus of policy from technological development to applica-
tion. 
 
1. Introduction 
Japanese space policy is now in a transition.  By the time of publication of this article, a 
bill might have been submitted to the Diet for establishing the "Basic Law of Space Activities", 
submitted by members of the Diet1.  This is the first time since the late-1960s that Japanese politi-
cians took action for intervening space policy-making.  This law not only aims for stimulating 
space activities in Japan, but for transforming the normative base of Japanese space policy-making 
from R&D oriented policy to user-driven policy.  Furthermore, it challenges the normative assump-
tion of "exclusively peaceful purpose" clause in the Diet resolution in 1969.  These aims and chal-
lenges are indeed a significant change from the past experience of Japanese space policy-making.   
It is the task of this paper to explore why such a change happened in Japan.  Why, in a 
sudden, politicians became interested in committing themselves in space policy?  What made them 
changed their minds?  How is this transformation accepted by traditionally dominating space actors 
such as JAXA?  What would be the consequences if the Basic Law passed the Diet?  And, after all, 
does this Basic Law transform Japanese space policy-making process?  In answering these ques-
                                 
1 Most of Japanese law is submitted by the government.  Over 85% of the law passed the Diet is drafted by bureau-
crats and submitted by the Minister of concerned issues.  The number of law submitted by the members of Diet is 
gradually increasing, but it is still marginal to the government-sponsored law. 
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tions, this paper discusses the context of Japanese space policy-making since 1960s, and recent 
changes of circumstances around space activities in Japan.  It will then examine the proposed con-
tents of the Basic Law and analyzes the aims and objectives of the Law.  Through this analysis, this 
paper intends to provide possible scenarios of Japanese space policy development in near future. 
 
2. Japanese Space Policy-making in Context 
It is often said that Japanese space policy is incomprehensible.  Perhaps, one of the rea-
sons of this incomprehensibility is that Japanese space policy does not share the same normative as-
sumptions with other spacefaring states2.  First of all, there was a very little political and strategic 
implication in space policy.  It is largely due to the fact that Japan, with a pacifist Constitution, re-
frained from using space for security purposes.  In 1969, the Diet has adopted a resolution called 
“Space Development for Exclusively Peaceful Purposes”, which limited any involvement of defense 
authority for investing in, owning of and operating space systems.  In other words, all Japanese 
space programs were conducted under civilian authority in the name of research and development of 
new technology. 
Because of this Diet resolution, the space activities were entirely isolated and folded into a 
category of Science and Technology policy.  The strategic goal for Japanese space policy was, thus, 
set to “catch-up” with other advanced spacefaring countries such as the United States or Europe.  
For many politicians, space was a "necktie of advanced countries3", which suggests that Japanese 
space policy was developed for national prestige of being a member of advanced industrialized 
countries' club.   
This normative context is extremely important for understanding current transition of Jap-
anese space policy-making.  For a long time, most of space programs --- even application programs 
for communication, broadcasting, and meteorology --- were driven by technological excellence.  In 
other words, robustness, reliability, and low cost were not the priority for Japanese space manufac-
turers.  They were more interested in adapting new technologies and progressing in engineering 
know-how.  Furthermore, because space policy was folded in science and technology policy, the 
focus on technology and R&D was justified by politicians and financial authority for granting large 
sum of budget. 
Secondly, given the technological focus of Japanese space policy, the major deci-
sion-makers were not politicians or ministers, but bureaucratic machinery.  For a long time, Japa-
nese space policy was dominated by Science and Technology Agency (STA) and Ministry of Educa-
tion, Culture and Sports (MoE).  Space Activities Commission (SAC) under Cabinet Office was 
                                 
2 For understanding the development of Japan's space policy logics, see Kazuto Suzuki, "Administrative Reforms 
and Policy Logics of Japanese Space Policy", Space Policy, vol.21 no.1, 2005: pp.11-19. 
3 This expression was used by Shinya Matsuura in his book Kokusan Rocket ha Naze Ochirunoka (Why Japanese 
Launcher fails). Nikkei BP Publishers, 2004. 
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acting as the inter-ministerial coordination framework, but because STA was in charge for providing 
secretariat services, most of decision-making at SAC was initiated and framed by STA.  This engi-
neer-bureaucrat oriented policy making framework did not change even when there was a large mi-
nisterial restructuring early in this century.  
 At the beginning of 2001, STA and MoE merged into a very big ministry (Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology: MEXT) in charge of two principle space agen-
cies, National Space Development Agency (NASDA) and Institute of Space and Aeronautical 
Science (ISAS).  The two agencies were eventually merged to create a single agency for aerospace 
(Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency: JAXA) together with National Aerospace Laboratory 
(NAL).  At the same time, the inter-ministerial decision-making body for space, Space Activities 
Committee (SAC), was reduced its responsibility only to the supervision of the space activities 
within MEXT and JAXA.  Instead, the Council of Science and Technology Policy (CSTP), of 
which the prime minister is the chairperson, was created to oversee national strategy for all areas of 
science and technology policy including space4.   
However, this administrative reform has not changed the normative base of Japanese space 
policy-making.  Still the bureaucratic machinery was in charge of the decision-making, and struc-
ture for strategic planning and political intervention did not emerge.  Meanwhile, the old bureau-
cratic tradition based on the ex-STA engineers remained in this newly created larger ministries and 
inter-ministerial body such as CSTP which was busy dealing with variety of science and technologi-
cal issues other than space.   
Thirdly, relating to the first and the second points, the accord with United States in 1990 
for opening government satellite procurement for public tender enhanced the normative assumption 
for Japan to focus on technological development.  During the late 1980s, Reagan and Bush Sr. ad-
ministrations strongly claimed that Japan was a country with unfair trade, threatening to invoke un-
ilateral sanction against Japan by using Article 301 of the US Trade Act (so-called "super 301").  
The US government criticised that Japanese government protected its industry through opaque pub-
lic procurement protocols, regulations, and business customs, which made it difficult for the US in-
dustry to penetrate Japanese market.  The US government threatened to impose punitive tariff on 
Japanese major export items such as automobile and super computer.  At the end of the negotiation, 
Japanese government agreed to conclude an accord for opening the public procurement procedure of 
non-R&D satellite for international bidders5.  This agreement had a very damaging effect on Japa-
nese satellite industry, since its competitiveness was much lower than that of US companies, and in 
                                 
4 For understanding the process of administrative reform and space policy in Japan, see Suzuki, op. cit. 
5 See Masahiko Sato, T. Kosuge, and P. van Fenema, "Legal Implications on Satellite Procurement and Trade Issues 
between Japan and the United States", Paper presented in Institute of International Space Law Conference 
(IISL-99-IISL.3.13), 1999. 
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fact, almost all non-R&D satellites were procured from US manufacturers since then6.  However, 
Japanese companies kept calm over this agreement which may have devastating effect on their busi-
ness, because most of satellite manufacturers in Japan were producers of super computers and elec-
tronic goods.  It was also them who would have suffered if the US government had imposed sanc-
tions.  Putting it simply, they preferred supercomputer over satellites. 
As a result of this agreement, NASDA had to focus on R&D satellite which was the only 
allowed activity for the government to offer contracts to Japanese industry.  The industry, on the 
other hand, was not extremely enthusiastic for improving its competitiveness, largely because they 
considered that the space business was not commercially profitable, and it was sufficient to receive 
R&D contracts from NASDA for its survival.  Furthermore, the rationale to keep their space busi-
ness was to contribute Japanese technological development for strengthening the position of Japan in 
international arena, thus, there were little incentives for Japanese industry to take risks for commer-
cialization of space or to reduce costs and improve its efficiency.   
 
3. Changing Economic and Administrative Circumstances 
Concerns over government's budget deficit and inefficiency of bureaucracy has been a 
subject of political discussion since mid-1990s.  Due to the long-term recession, tax revenue conti-
nuously declined while inefficient bureaucratic expenditure was in a trend of increase.  Since the 
beginning of 1990s, government bond issue has increased dramatically for stimulating stagnated 
economy.  In 1994, the cumulated debts exceeded 200 trillion yen (about $1.81 trillion), which is 
beyond the total of debt of third world countries.  In 1998, it doubled to 427 trillion yen (about 
$3.81 trillion), and currently in 2006, it is 827 trillion yen (about $7.51 trillion)7.  This explosive 
increase of public debt made Japanese government on the verge of bankruptcy.  The government 
was forced to take action to reduce government spending and revitalise the economy.  In 1996, 
Prime Minister Hashimoto initiated a project to rationalise ministerial structure and to reduce the 
number of civil servants.  Hashimoto who had a keen awareness of the budgetary problem realised 
that it was time to shift towards "small and efficient government".  This period also coincided with 
strong criticism against corruption, opaque decision-making process, and favouritism toward big 
business was mounting.  Thus, for avoiding public criticism and decreasing government spending, 
the discussion for administrative reform began.  The process of implementation of ministerial 
reform took more than five years because of a strong opposition from bureaucrats and their allied 
politicians.  As a result of this reform, MoE merged with STA (which is now called Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology or MEXT) and MITI became the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) by absorbing the some functions of the Economic Planning 
                                 
6 The only exception was the Multipurpose Transport Satellite 2 (MTSAT-2). 
7 Ministry of Finance, National Debt Report 2006 (Exchange rate $1=¥110). 
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Agency. 
The merger of MoE and STA, the supervising ministries of NASDA and ISAS respectively, 
raised expectation in space policy community that this would end the long-standing division within 
the Japanese space policy and would induce a synergy effect.  However, the consequence of this 
merger increased the confusion of the policy-making process.  Because of the principle of ex-
changing personnel between two ministries, the head of space policy division of MEXT was desig-
nated as a seat of former education bureaucrat.  The center of space policy-making in the MEXT 
was occupied by those who have experience in academic grant, exchange student affairs and ele-
mentary school education.  Even before the merger, the head of the division was occupied by 
non-space expert, but at least the head had some background knowledge in the fields of science and 
technology.  The administrative reform seemingly increased the efficiency, but in reality, it created 
confusion in space policy-making. 
Speaking of the confusion of space policy-making, the administrative reform also influ-
enced the position of the highest level of decision-making.  SAC, once the central inter-ministry 
coordinating body and reporting directly to the Prime Minister, became much smaller organisation 
only responsible for the JAXA matters (though it deals with most of the space activity in Japan).  
Currently no inter-ministerial coordination for space activities exists.  On the other hand, CSTP was 
created to coordinate S&T policy independently from ministries.  Although the CSTP is much 
higher organisation in bureaucratic hierarchy, it does not have the power to formulate budget line.  
It is only an advisory council for the Prime Minister.  The SAC, on the other hand, still maintains 
the power to decide how much fund should be allocated to which programs.  However, since SAC 
became only a committee under MEXT, the decision of SAC is no longer the final one as it should 
be channelled through MEXT for further negotiation with the Ministry of Treasury.  The impor-
tance of SAC is diminished further because the chairman is no longer the Secretary of State for 
Science and Technology, but it is chaired by someone outside space community, who has less influ-
ence and knowledge about the space activities.  The confusion in the decision-making process thus 
continues. 
In addition to the confusion in decision-making process, there are severe financial con-
straints on Japanese space policy.  Although the nominal space budget does maintain a flat line at 
200 billion Yen (about $1.8 billion) for the last few years, the real money which is spent on Japanese 
space programmes is seriously dropping.  This lack of funding was not only due to the budgetary 
constraints, but also from the lower priority and political attention from the government.  With the 
consecutive failures (ADEOS-2, Planet-B, and H-IIA with two IGS satellites) in early 2000s, Japa-
nese government began to question whether the funding for space development was efficiently used 
to bring successful missions.  The general trend of shrinking budget may not change for a while.  
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4. Shocks in Post-Cold War Period 
But most importantly, the post-Cold War period has brought new circumstances to Japa-
nese space strategy.  First of all, the changes of security environment have made it difficult for Ja-
pan to continue its pacifist policy.  During the Cold War, there was a mutual interest between the 
governments of Japan and the United States.  For the US, it was important to have Japan as a front 
line defense towards the Soviet and Communist threat to Pacific Ocean.  For Japan, the alliance 
with the US was the core of its pacifist concept for not having any offensive military forces.  With-
out US forces present in Japan, it would only be able to defend when the hostile action taken place in 
its territory and not be able to take any counter-measure in enemy's territory.   
However, the situation in the post-Cold War period is somewhat different from the pre-
vious period.  The threat of Communism has dramatically reduced, and the reasons for stationing 
US troops in Japan became also ambiguous.  Although the US still maintained a need for stationing 
in Japan as a forward deployment base, it does no longer imperative to protect Japan in the name of 
alliance.  Thus, the US government shifted its policy to "share more burdens" with Japanese gov-
ernment, in other words, Japan should contribute more for the actions of the United States for the 
security matters.  The consequence of this was Japanese participation in War on Terror, particularly 
deployment of naval forces to support US-led operation in Afghanistan and ground troops in Iraq.   
Through these operations, Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) realized the important 
technological gap for its own operations.  Since SDF was restricted from developing and operating 
its own space capabilities, it had to rely on commercial satellite communication and commercial 
imagery services.  Because in the past, SDF was not supposed to go beyond its borders, so there 
was no need for communication in long distance or collecting imagery of other countries other than 
its neighbours.  Furthermore, through these operations, SDF realized that there is a wide gap of 
military technology between Japan and the United States forces, particularly with fast-developing 
US military transformation and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  Given the increasing possi-
bility of Japan's sharing security burden and joint operation with US forces, SDF and Japanese De-
fense Agency (JDA) recognized the importance of developing space capability for narrowing the 
gap. 
However, that was not the end of the story.  The perception of Japanese people on securi-
ty matters has dramatically changed by two events.  First, the imminent threat of North Korea be-
came visible when the Taepodong flew over Japanese territory in 1998.  It was a big change of the 
policy paradigm.  This incident put Japanese public as well as policy community in a panic mode.  
There was a strong demand to do something for avoiding North Korean to launch missiles towards 
Japan and protect our homeland.  Thus, immediately after the Taepodong launch, the government 
made a decision to start a new satellite program, Information Gathering Satellite (IGS).   
Nevertheless, it was seriously constrained by the existing legal interpretation.  Although 
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it was clear that the purpose of IGS was to monitor military activities of possible threats such as 
North Korea, but it was disguised as a "multi-purpose" (note: it was even difficult to mention 
"dual-use" because it implies the possibility of the participation of JDA) satellite, which also serves 
for civilian purpose.   
However, because of the 1990 accord with the United States for satellite procurement, the 
IGS as a civilian non R&D satellite should be placed under open procurement procedure.  This has 
put Japanese government in a serious dilemma.  If the government wants to develop IGS as mul-
ti-purpose satellite, the specification of satellite has to be open to public, but it cannot grant a de-
fense satellite status (which is assumed to be exempted from 1990 Accord on satellite procurement) 
due to the Diet resolution. 
The solution of this dilemma came from a careful legal interpretation.  The government 
placed the control of the satellite not under JDA, but Cabinet Secretariat, a small office with national 
intelligence gathering mission and crisis management functions.  So, the IGS was formally de-
signed as a "crisis management satellite" with both civilian and military purposes8.   
This incident provided a wide-ranging understanding among politicians that the legal con-
straints of "exclusively peaceful purpose" resolution was too strict to have a room for maneuver, and 
under the changing security environment in the post-Cold War period, it is non-sense to maintain 
such a rigid pacifist rules. 
Furthermore, the development of Missile Defense (MD) program and Japanese Cabinet 
decision for participation to the program in 2003 raised another difficult question for Japanese space 
and security community.  On the one hand, because of the "exclusively peaceful purpose" resolu-
tion, JDA and SDF would not be able to develop, launch and operate its own early warning or track-
ing satellite, which gathers crucial information about missile launch.  Without its own early warn-
ing satellite, JDA has to depend on the early warning information from the United States.  However, 
if JDA entirely depends on the US intelligence for initiating the deployment of MD counter-attack 
missiles, it would touch upon the sensitive issue of "collective defense".  Japanese government took 
a unique interpretation of its Constitution Article 9 that Japan holds the right of collective defense, 
but it would not exercise it.  So, if MD is set and ready for operation, but it would not be able to 
launch counter-attack missile unless the command comes from Japanese own early warning satellite.  
Thus, many people in Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), particularly those who are interested in de-
fense issues, strongly demanded to reconsider the "exclusively peaceful purpose" clause of the Diet 
resolution in 1969. 
 
5. Kawamura's Initative 
                                 
8 Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Tanjo Kokusan Spai Eisei (The Birth of National Spy Satellite), Nikkei publishers, 2005. 
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 Although there has been an increasing demand for altering the interpretation of the "exclu-
sively peaceful purpose" resolution, mounting financial pressure for administrative change and re-
ducing space budget, there was no serious action taken by the government or politicians.  However, 
the change started in early 2005 by Takeo Kawamura, a LDP politician who just left from the Minis-
ter of MEXT.  During his ministership, he witnessed the failure of H-IIA no.6 launch carrying two 
IGS satellites.  Although he was only responsible for the MEXT competence, which was the launch 
of H-IIA, the public as well as the government accused him for not supervising properly for nation-
ally important satellite project, IGS.  From his point of view, this was a huge twist of responsibility 
and competence.  Even though JAXA was involved in the development of some technological as-
pects of IGS, he was clearly out of the loop and no position to take responsibility.  In fact, there was 
no one who was directly in charge with IGS project because the main user, JDA, was supposed not 
to be involved in this program due to the Diet resolution.  The Cabinet Secretariat, the nominal au-
thority for IGS, was unable to take responsibility for its development and launch because of the 
shortage of manpower.  Thus, neither JDA, Cabinet Secretariat, nor MEXT (and JAXA) was di-
rectly involved in this program.  Kawamura thought that this was a critical failure of implementing 
national strategy, and something had to be done. 
 As soon as he stepped down from the Minister of MEXT, he formed a informal study 
group called "Consultation Group for National Strategy for Space (in short, it is called Kawamura 
Consultation Group)" with members of LDP working as Vice-Ministers in various ministries includ-
ing MEXT, METI, JDA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).  This Consultation Group inten-
sively discussed the problems that Japanese space policy-making process including the amendment 
of the interpretation of "exclusively peaceful purpose" resolution and several pub-
lic-private-partnership program such as Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) and privatization of 
H-IIA9.   
 After 10 meetings of Kawamura Consultation Group, it produced a report in October 
200510.  This 100-some pages document argues that the source of problems on space policy-making 
is the lack of coherent strategy and institutional arrangement.  Because of the historical background, 
Japanese space policy was dominated by the STA/MEXT and folded in the sphere of Science and 
Technology policy without strategic plan for using space assets for pursuing national strategic objec-
tives, it argues.  This particularity of Japanese space policy-making process has let Japanese space 
industry down and the presence of Japan in international stage small.   
 Thus, this report proposes to establish a law for defining new objectives for space activi-
                                 
9 See Kazuto Suzuki, 'Adopting the European Model: Japanese Experience in Implementing Pub-
lic-Private-Partnership in Space Program', Council for European Studies Fifteenth Biennial International Conference, 
The Drake (Chicago, Illinois), 31 March, 2006. 
10 The report of the Consultation Group for National Strategy for Space: Towards a construction of new institutions 
for space development and utilization, October 2005. 
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ties and institutional framework for structuring space policy-making process more coherent with 
three new settings.  First, the report proposes that the government should create a ministerial post 
with a portfolio of space.  This new ministerial post will be the center for strategic thinking and 
planning of space.  The report underlines that the source of the problems of Japanese space policy 
is its concentration on developing new technology and lack of attention to the users' needs and de-
mands, so it claims that the new minister for space shall make efforts to bring the user ministries in 
the process of policy-making for space, and aggregate the user needs which should be reflected to 
the R&D program.  Also the minister shall involve the defense and foreign policy authorities to use 
space assets for advancing Japanese space capability for security and foreign policy under current 
constitutional framework.   
 Second, the report also demands the government to establish a new forum of space user 
ministries.  This forum, under the chairmanship of the new Minister for space, would be partici-
pated by the Ministers or Vice-Ministers of space user ministries including Ministries of Agriculture, 
Land and Transportation, Telecommunication etc.  This idea came from the experience of the fail-
ure of QZSS, where four ministries, Ministry of Transportation (MLIT), of Telecommunications 
(MIC), METI and MEXT, were not able to make a compromise for sharing the financial burden for 
the program.  Kawamura and the members of the Consultation Group were concerned the lack of 
coherent understanding among these ministries for supporting the program, and thought that the 
reason for this failure was because there was no dialogue among the ministries in the first place and 
no ministry wanted to take responsibility.   
 Third, this report suggests that the political community, including members of Consulta-
tion Group, should initiate the new discussion for the interpretation of the "exclusively peaceful 
purpose" resolution.  Because this resolution was taken at the legislative body, the Diet, and it binds 
the action of the executive branch of the government.  So, the decision to change the interpretation 
of the resolution should come from the Diet members.  As discussed above, the political interest in 
space policy was not high for so many years, and there was no initiative from the Diet members for 
changing this resolution.   
 Furthermore, the report urged the government to take serious consideration for using space 
for achieving diplomatic objectives.  Among the members of the Consultation Group, there was a 
strong concern about the development of Chinese space program.  Of course, the members were 
impressed by the successful manned-space program, but their concern was not about the competition 
in the manned-space capability or space race for the Moon.  Instead, their attention was paid to the 
recent development of Chinese action towards other Asian countries.  In 2005, Chinese government 
concluded the signing of the establishing agreement for APSCO11 (Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation 
                                 
11 "Asia-Pacific nations sign space convention", China Daily, October 27, 2005 
(http://www.chinanews.cn//news/2005/2005-10-29/13271.html, Last seen 20 July, 2006). 
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Organization) with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand and Tur-
key12.  Although the Charter of APSCO has not entered into effect because it is currently under the 
ratification process, the presence of Chinese space in Asian region is remarkably high.  They have 
already established AP-MCSTA (Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and 
Applications)13 with 13 member states.  AP-MCSTA is an organization for developing small satel-
lite technology and user-oriented applications.  Both APSCO and AP-MCSTA are initiated by Chi-
nese government, and they are attracting a lot of attention from developing countries.  For many 
years, Japan was the leading country in this region and JAXA and MEXT was proud to initiate 
APRSAF (Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum)14 which coordinates the space program and 
enhance the cooperation among the space agencies in this region.  However, this organization, as 
one might imagine, focused only technical aspects of space programs of different space agency, and 
there was no coordination of strategy or policy.  There was a wide dissatisfaction from the members 
that Japan was not supporting the needs of developing countries, which was the transfer of technol-
ogy and collaborative projects for space hardware, but JAXA could not appropriately respond to 
those demands.  Thus, the Chinese initiatives attracted more attention. 
 In addition to the emerging Chinese role in Asian region, the members of Consultation 
Group paid close attention to the Chinese endeavor for using space as a diplomatic tool for bilateral 
relationship.  Under a severe increase of oil price, China offered its satellite technology to Nigeria 
and Venezuela, both oil producing countries, for strengthening the bilateral relationship15.  Since 
Japan as a huge oil importing country, the Chinese action towards these countries seems to be 
threatening for the secure supply of oil.  The members of Consultation Group asked questions why 
Japan was not able to do the same thing before China did.  They came to a conclusion that it was 
because Japanese space policy was so concentrated on the R&D, and JAXA was not closely asso-
ciated with MoFA.  Particularly, Katsuyuki Kawai, then Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and the 
member of the Consultation Group, was furious about the response of the MoFA and JAXA to his 
demand for using satellite images to support Japan's contribution to the aftermath of Tsunami in In-
donesia.   
 These frustrations of the Vice-Ministers in the Consultation Group encouraged the report 
to be more blunt and explicit to call for more political and strategic thinking to space policy.  The 
members of Consultation Group realized that if Japanese government let JAXA to take responsibility 
                                 
12 Turkey has recently signed the ASPCO Charter.  See, "Turkey Signs Up For Asia-Pacific Space Program", Xin-
hua News Agency, 5 June, 2006. 
13 Even after the establishment of APSCO, this organization will continue to exist as a gateway for APSCO mem-
bership.  For more information, see http://www.apmcsta.org/. 
14 For detail, see http://www.aprsaf.org/. 
15 "China Prepares To Export First Satellite", Space Daily, July 3, 2005 
(http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-05zzzu.html, Last seen: 10 September, 2006); "China, Venezuela sign satel-
lite launch agreement", China Daily, November 12, 2005 
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-11/02/content_3718959.htm, Last seen: 10 September, 2006) 
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for international cooperation, it would lose the advantage of Japan being the leader in this region, 
and thus, they demanded the government to take serious consideration for coordinating Japanese 
foreign policy and APRSAF activities.   
 With these concerns in mind, the report of the Consultation Group was received well by 
the members of LDP and the government.  The Kawamura's initiative paved the way for Japan to 
transform its space policy-making process. 
 
6. For Establishing the Basic Law 
 Kawamura's ambition did not stop by publishing this report.  He also brought this report 
to the Policy Research Council of LDP.  As a ruling party, LDP's Policy Research Council has a 
strong leverage to change the government policy.  It has the right to initiate policies and legislative 
actions, and without the consent of this Council, no legislative proposal would pass the Diet.  Ka-
wamura found that it would be appropriate to discuss his idea of reforming space policy-making in 
LDP, rather than bringing the issue to the government (as often in the case of Japanese poli-
cy-making process), because he needs the support of Diet members to re-interpret the "exclusively 
peaceful purpose" resolution.  With support from Hidenao Nakagawa, then the Director of Policy 
Research Council and the No.3 of the LDP, Kawamura established "Special Committee on Space 
Development (SCSD)" and he became the leader of the Committee16. 
 With large number of Diet members, SCSD attracted a lot of media attention and gradually 
the participants of the meeting increased.  By bringing space matter at LDP policy priority, many 
Diet members began to realize the importance of space activities in the national strategy and through 
media coverage, public too began to understand Kawamura's intention.  In July 2006, the second 
North Korean missile launch campaign gave an extra boost to SCSD, because the public opinion 
dynamically shifted from guarding pacifist principles to more flexible interpretation of "exclusively 
peaceful purpose" clause. 
 Under these circumstances, SCSD of LDP decided to submit the "Basic Law on Space Ac-
tivities" in next Diet session staring from September 2006 (though the submission of the draft law 
eventually postponed to January 2007 due to the lengthy negotiation with coalition partner, Komei-
to).  The draft of Basic Law is already drafted and ready to be submitted.  Let's look at some of the 
features of this new draft. 
 The first impression of this Basic Law is that it is a straight reflection of Kawamura Con-
sultation Group report.  It will set up new Minister for Space and Space Development Headquarters 
(a forum of user ministries with strong authority).  The Minister for Space would be a "specially 
                                 
16 Formally, Shinya Ono is the Chairman of the Committee and Kawamura was only a Sub-chair for some reasons.  
Because Kawamura was already a Chairman of other committee (on Education), he was not able to chair two com-
mittees at once as party rule states.  Thus, he was only a sub-chair, but Ono refrained from acting as a chairman in 
respect to Kawamura's initiative, so Kawamura was acting as de facto chairman. 
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designated" minister who will not be in charge of the management of the ministry but to reside in the 
Cabinet Office for coordinating policies of different ministries.  The Headquarters will be com-
posed by all the ministers and some specially appointed members from academia and industry.  Al-
though this is an ambitious challenge, concerning the conservative attitude of the government to-
wards any reform, there are hopes that these new institutions would provide positive force for more 
political attention and dynamics in space activities.  However, one concern remains about the fiscal 
competency of this new Minister for Space.  The Basic Law avoided to define who will draft the 
budget proposal and whether the Headquarters would have the power to formulate budget.  Cur-
rently, the space budget is defined by the proposals from different ministries.  The majority of the 
budget goes to MEXT/JAXA, some portion goes to Cabinet Secretariat for IGS, and the rest splits 
into different ministries for utilization of space assets.  As long as this budgetary structure remains, 
it would be difficult for the Minister for Space and Headquarters to take initiatives for user-driven 
programs because the user ministries would be reluctant to spare their limited budget, and MEXT 
would refuse to reallocate its own budget.  However, one member of SCSD suggested that the 
Headquarters would be the final decision-making body for the allocation of budget by bundling all 
budget request from various ministries and negotiate with the Ministry of Finance on behalf of those 
ministries17.  This would give a significant leverage for the Headquarters because any budget re-
quest would have to go through the Headquarter, and ministries would lose their competence on de-
fining space program without consent of the Headquarters and the Minister for Space. 
 The second point of the Basic Law is the question of security.  As discussed above, the 
"exclusively peaceful purpose" resolution was under pressure in changing security environment 
around Japan in the post-Cold War period.  Kawamura Consultation Group discussed this matter 
extensively, but did not give conclusive position on how to deal with the resolution.  But in SCSD 
with a lot of members interested in security issues, many politicians fiercely insisted that the inter-
pretation should be changed.  Thus, the SCSD set up a sub-committee to discuss the possible sce-
nario for changing the resolution and it came up with an idea to set out the security objective in the 
Basic Law.  Obviously, Law is more binding than resolution.  So, SCSD finally concluded that the 
one of the objectives of the Basic Law is "to promote the security of our homeland and people by 
contributing Japanese space capability to the international security arrangement".  The SCSD, par-
ticularly Kawamura as an acting chairman of the Committee, strongly emphasized that this change 
of interpretation does not aim for aggressive use of space, i.e. enhancing Japanese military capability 
for invasion or using military forces to solve international disputes.  Instead, this Basic Law con-
firms the principle of the Article 9 of the Constitution.  The space assets will be used for crisis 
management and disaster monitoring in Asian region or peacekeeping missions in distant territories.  
                                 
17 Informal interview with the member of SCSD, under the condition of anonymity (December 22, 2006). 
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It implies that Japan might have early warning satellite for MD which also falls into a category of 
self-defense.  Thus, the Basic Law is designed to strengthen Japanese role in dispute settlement and 
crisis management with a peaceful means.  It only tries to change the interpretation of the Diet res-
olution which prevented any use of space assets by military authority. 
 The third point of the Basic Law is about "industrialization" of space industry.  Since 
1990 when the Accord with the United States for satellite procurement entered into force, Japanese 
satellite industry lost its opportunity to improve international competitiveness through government 
programs.  During the period of commercialization in the late-1990s, Japanese industry was not 
able to enter into the booming market (in retrospect, it might have limited the damage from the 
downturn of the market though).  Nevertheless, long history of concentrating on R&D and tech-
nological development has made Japanese industry entirely relying on the government R&D funding, 
which was decreasing due to the fiscal constraints.  Furthermore, because of the nature of govern-
ment-funded R&D projects, Japanese industry was not concentrated on improving international 
competitiveness, i.e. improving reliability, reducing costs and meeting with deadlines.  If Japanese 
industry continues to depend on government procurement, Japanese industrial and technological ca-
pability will inevitably face the cul-de-sac.  The weakening of Japanese industrial base would un-
dermine its capacity to develop space system for security purposes.  Thus, the Basic Law urged the 
government as well as the industry to steer up its effort of "industrialization", i.e. strengthening in-
dustrial capability and autonomous business foundation from public budget.  In order to achieve 
this objective, the Basic Law argues to set up a policy of "anchor tenancy", which borrows the idea 
of Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) exercised in Europe.  Particularly, the experience of Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) scheme of SKYNET 5, British military communication satellite, was consi-
dered as an ideal model.  The PFI scheme would be able to avoid infringement with 1990 Accord 
since it is not a pure "public procurement" as such.  The procuring body is not the government 
agency but private enterprise, and the government only plays the role of principal customer.  The 
private enterprise would have stable income from government user fee, but it would endeavor mar-
ket opportunity if the satellite is not used by the government.  In fact, this scheme was employed in 
the case of QZSS18, but as discussed above, it was unsuccessful because of the turmoil in the gov-
ernment.  So the SCSD believed that if the Minister for Space takes the initiative and the Head-
quarters functions properly, the government can offer stable "anchor tenancy" to the private enter-
prise, and the "industrialization" would be successful.   
 Although the Basic Law focuses extensively on the user-side of space projects, it does not 
neglect the importance of R&D.  However, its interest in R&D is not based on the concept of tech-
nological "catch-up", but on the originality and national prestige.  The experience of "Hayabusa" 
                                 
18 See Suzuki, 'Adopting the European Model', op. cit. 
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was a good example of the new concept of R&D.  For many years, Japanese space R&D focused to 
domestically reproduce the technology available elsewhere.  But the Basic Law demands that the 
copying of someone's technology is not the way to improve industrial competitiveness or strategic 
importance of space.  Instead, it argues that developing original plan and technology which would 
fascinate the public and international space community would serve better for Japan. 
  
7. Conclusion 
 After analyzing the objectives and aims of the Basic Law, the obvious questions should be 
asked: Is this really possible?  Does anyone, particularly those who benefited from the old regime, 
object to this proposal?  Would user ministries happily cooperate with the new Minister for Space, 
particularly Japanese Defense Agency which developed a habit of not using space?  Does industry 
change from comfortable dependence on the government budget to taking business risks?   
 Of course, changing normative foundation of policy-making is not easy.  It is always a 
political struggle.  MEXT and JAXA might be the strongest opposition since they might lose the 
monopoly situation of space policy-making.  In response to these changes, JAXA began to shift its 
policy focus from R&D to more user-oriented programs in satellite programs for providing impres-
sion that it is adopting the new policy objectives, but at the same time, JAXA strongly claims that 
Japan is still behind other countries and "catching up" is needed.  On the other hand, JDA, which 
became the Ministry of Defense in January 2007, set up a new "Strategy Planning Office" which in-
cludes space as one of the pillar of strategic policy19.  Industry might be reluctant to be autonomous 
from the government budget, but it realized that the government expenditure is in decline with or 
without Basic Law.   
 If Japanese space policy-making process continues as it is today, the space community 
would be in jeopardy.  Although Japanese economy is in recovery, space budget would unlikely in-
crease under any circumstance because the huge government deficit and debt would not be resolved 
in foreseeable future.  International competitiveness of space industry needs to be improved in or-
der to sustain sufficient level of technological and industrial base.  And most of all, the "exclusively 
peaceful purpose" resolution should be redefined in uncertain security condition around Japan.  The 
world has changed from Cold War structure, and it is the time for Japan to transform its space policy.  
 
                                 
19 While JDA was an agency, the strategic decision making was in the hands of Prime Minister and Cabinet Secretary.  
But because of the change of status to Ministry, it became autonomously responsible for strategic planning. 
